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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) (1996 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it violated the provisions of 
Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, and Rohan's due process and equal 
protection rights as guaranteed by the both the Constitution of the United States and 
the Utah Constitution when it refused to grant a continuance or voluntary dismissal and 
dismissed his case with prejudice, after Mr. Rohan had made a prima facie showing 
that he was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. 
Standard of review: 
The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of statutes, 
rules and ordinances is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Rushton v Salt Lake 
County. 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). 
The issue was preserved for review in Plaintiffs Motion for Voluntary 
Dismissal, Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal or Alternatively 
Motion to Continue Trial Setting to Consider Plaintiffs Claims Under the ADA and 
Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59 or Alternatively Motion to 
Amend. 
2. The trial court erred as a matter of law, and abused its discretion when 
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it denied Rohan's motions for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) after Mr. 
Rohan had made a prima facie showing that he was a qualified individual with a 
disability under the ADA. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its 
discretion when it dismissed Rohan's case with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 
Standard of Review 
The appropriate standard of review for determining whether the trial court 
properly denied Rohan's first motion for voluntary dismissal is abuse of discretion. 
The appropriate standard of review for determining whether the trial court 
properly denied Rohan's second motion for voluntary dismissal after he had established 
he was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, presents a mixed 
question of law and fact to the court. Factual questions are to be reviewed under the 
clearly erroneous standard and legal questions under the correctness standard. Jeffs v 
Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1999), State v Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-9 (Utah 
1994). "A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of 
law." Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 (1996). 
The appropriate standard of review for determining whether the trial court 
properly dismissed Mr. Rohan's case pursuant to Rule 41(b) is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 954 
(Utah App. 1988). 
The issue was preserved for review in Plaintiffs Motion for Voluntary 
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Dismissal, Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal or Alternatively 
Motion to Continue Trial Setting to Consider Plaintiffs Claims Under the ADA, and 
p l ; n n t j | f . M n ( , i M , ( n , K | r « [ p i l I!»11 IM,I f>1111 h i \(u\i: S M ,n M k l f U t i M l M i I iii l 
Amend. 
3. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion iiit 
contravention of R;t lie 40(b) of the I Jtah R tiles; of Ci v 11 Procedure, when it denied 
R ol lan's first and secoi id i notioi is foi a conth n lance. 
Standard of review: 
The appropriate standard of review for determining whether the trial court 
properly denied Rohan s first motion for a continuance is abuse ol discretion. 
continuances, Christenson v. Jewkes, 701 V.2d i j / ^ 3 l i77 ^LtaL IVbbj, and their 
decision will not be overturned unless that discretion has been clearly abused, see State 
v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d408, 113 (1 Ill .j ih 1993). An abuse of discretion may be i* un-.i ^ 
a pai 1:> 1: las "made tii i iel> objectioi is, [1 las] gi\ ei I ;t iecessar> i lotice. ai id 1 las t i lade a 
reasonable effort to have the trial date changed for good cause." Id. Brown v. Glover, 
16 P.3d 540, 548-9 (Utah 2000). 
1 he • ippiopnalr slaiitlaul ol icuew 1 ot determining whether the trial court. 
properly denied Rohan's secoi id n lotion for a coi itini lance after R ohai I 1 lad i i lade a 
prima facie showing that he was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA 
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is correction of error. 
"A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of 
law." Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 (1996). 
The issues were preserved for review in Plaintiffs Motion for Voluntary 
Dismissal, Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal or Alternatively 
Motion to Continue Trial Setting to Consider Plaintiffs Claims Under the ADA, and 
Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59 or Alternatively Motion to 
Amend. 
4. The trial Court erred as a matter of law when it denied Rohan's motions 
for a new trial or alternatively motion to amend when he had made a prima facie 
showing that he was a qualified individual with an disability under the ADA. 
Standard of review: 
Although a trial court has broad discretion to deny a motion for new trial, where 
that denial is based on questions of law, the trial court's decision is reviewed for 
correctness. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1993); 
The issue was preserved for review in Plaintiff s Motion for New Trial Pursuant 
to Rule 59 or Alternatively Motion to Amend. 
5. The trial courts award of costs and attorney fees against Mr. Rohan 
pursuant to U. C. A. §78-27-56 was erroneous as a matter of law. 
-4-
Standard of review: 
The appropriate standard of review for the award of attorney fees under section 
78 27 56 reqi lires a tw o step anal}' sis As to w hethei the party lacked good faitl i, tl le 
trial court must make a factual finding of a party's subjective intent In additioi )„ the 
trial court must conclude, as a matter of law, that the action was without merit. 
Pennington v. Allstate Insurance Co.. 973 P.2d 932, 942 (FN 3 ) (Utah 1998). 
The issue was presei ved for review ii I Rol mi I'S Motioi I for New I rial Pursuant 
to Rule 59. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The issues raised in this appeal are governed by: 
A. The AttKTit/air \\ i|li I>r.al"h1ies Act, 41 I I S.( ^ I..'I II et. seq., 
(hereinafter the "ADA"), 
B. Rules 40(b), 41(a)(2), 41(b), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
C Rule 4-105 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration; 
E •. I I.C. A § 78 2 7 56 
E. The Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution; 
F Article 1 Section n Utah Constitution; 
G Article 1 Section i i \ -;ah Constitution; 
I L \IIKJI I Safn.i. "M I Hah Coiislilui.uii, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 28,1998 Joseph Rohan (hereinafter Rohan)) brought a lawsuit against 
the Chad and Gerald Boseman (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Boseman") 
seeking damages for injuries, including a closed head injury, sustained when a vehicle 
driven by Chad Boseman struck the vehicle Rohan was driving during an early 
morning snow storm in January 1997. Addendum Exhibit 1, Page 1 (Hereinafter A: 1:1) 
Initially, it appeared that the injuries sustained by Rohan consisted of a severe 
cervical sprain and his complaints of cognitive difficulties were attributed to effects of 
the cervical injury. In April 1997, after several months of treatment with little 
improvement in the cogitative difficulties, a brain MRI was ordered. The scan was 
abnormal showing changes typical of a closed head injury with axonal shearing. A CT 
scan of Rohan's brain done before the accident was normal. A:23:131-133, 128 
Neurological testing was also performed in May 1997 and showed Rohan was 
experiencing disrupted cognitive performance, with his performance being 
substantially below what would be expected, given his educational and vocational 
background. Rohan began cognitive therapy in November of 1997 and assessments 
done at that time indicated moderate dysfunction. A:23:134-137, 138-144. 
In July of 1998 due to the sleep problems Rohan had experienced since the 
accident, he underwent a sleep study, which showed a severely disrupted sleep cycle 
with a sleep efficiency of 41% (normal is greater than 90%), and a total absence of 
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REM sleep, additionally measurements of his attentiveness were markedly abnormal. 
As a result of the sleep study Rohan was prescribed stimulant medications to maintain 
wakefulne: ;s A:23:130: 1 15 153 
In May of 2000 shortly before the scheduled trial, testing by the 
nueropsychologist retained by Boseman showed Rohan was severely impaired in terms 
of memory skills and information processing. Although he performed better on a test 
of "v isi lal attentioi l tl lai i in 199' 5 ', 1 lis « risi ml i t lei noi > i ei i mined se\ ei ely ii i lpaii ed , i e. 
below the 10% percentile. The testing also showed continued significant impairment 
in the his verbal memory and learning including confusion and poor mental tracking. 
A:23:154-164. 
In August of 1/998 R ohai l v > as seen by R obertK Rothfeder ^ 4 D , I D , for ai I 
independent medical examination. Dr. Rothfeder found that as a result of the injuries 
sustained in the accident, Mr. Rohan had a 34% permanent partial impairment of the 
whole person. He stated that the closed head injury and posttraumatic brain injury 
along with tl le sic: ep disti n bai ice 1 lad a profoi it id affe • ::t oi i R ol lai r s acti\ iti.es. of daily 
living. Dr. Rothfeder, stated that in his opinion the intellectual impairments suffered 
by Rohan had essentially resulted in a 100% disability with respect to the independent 
practice of law , A.J..> n»s» low 
A tier tilli ig the la wsi lit, the par ties begai 1 disco\ ery andei itered ii lto settlen lei it 
negotiations. Despite the fact that the court docket reflected activity during 14 of 20 
months since the complaint had been filed, the trial court ordered the parties to appear 
on November 18, 1999 and show cause why the case should not be dismissed for 
failure to prosecute. At the hearing the trial court continued its own order to show 
cause for 60 days for certification of readiness for trial. A:l: l , On January 19, 2000, 
Rohan, pursuant to the trial courts order, filed his certification of readiness for trial. 
A:2:12-14. On February 1, 2000 Boseman filed an objection to the certificate of 
readiness for trial on the basis that there was ongoing discovery that had not been 
completed, and Boseman requested 120 days (until June 1, 2000) to complete 
discovery. A:3:15. A telephone conference was held on March 2, 2000 and the trial 
court, without addressing the Boseman objection, scheduled the trial for June 20,2000. 
A:l:l 
When Rohan learned that trial was set for June 2000, he began searching for 
experienced trial counsel to handle his case due to the fact that Mr. Halliday & Mr. 
Watkins had limited jury trial experience and they did not have any experience trying 
a brain injury case. Rohan contacted, and signed a fee agreement, with Robert F. Orton 
("Orton") of the law firm of Fabian & Clendenin to try the case. A:5:20, A:6:24, 
From March 2000 onward, Rohan's case was handled primarily by Mr. Orton. 
A:24:174,184. Orton represented Rohan at supplemental depositions in March and 
April and examined medical records at the offices of opposing counsel in May. 
Approximately one week before the scheduled pretrial Orton informed Mr. Rohan that 
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he would not try the case because he could not have the experts he needed for trial 
ready by June 20,2000. However, Orton agreed that Rohan could represent to the trial 
coi 11 t that if he were able t :) seci ire ai linety day contii n lai ice he, Oi toi i, would ti y the 
matter. A:6:24. Upon learning that Orton would not try the case without a continuance 
and with no hope of finding an attorney to try a brain injury case on such short notice, 
Rohan, filed a Motion for Continuance of Trial Setting, Withdrawal of Counsel, 
pre-trial which was scheduled the for the following Monday. This was eighteen days 
before the start of scheduled trial. Boseman would not stipulate to a continuance but 
did not oppose the motion A 4 * f 
P • •.: 1 lai fs first i i lotioi i for acoi itin/i mi ice on 
the grounds that there was no showing of good cause and a decision to change counsel 
15 days before trial is too late. A:7:27,28. On Juile 7, 2000, the day after the motion 
was denied, and knowing that Mr. Halliday and Mr. Watkins were not prepared to 
represent hnn .tslhe\ li.ul Urn imdu llu imptrsMuii «im v Man h tlut (>rl<ni ^mildlrv 
the case, Rohan filed a notice of discharge of his attorneys and his first motion for 
voluntary dismissal. A:8,9. On June 14,2000 the trial court denied the first motion for 
voluntary dismissal "for the reasons specified in the opposing memorandum." A: 11,41 
to Trial A: 12:43,44 in order to make clear to all concerned that he would not and could 
-9. 
not to proceed to trial and that expenditures of time and resources by Boseman and the 
trial court were unjustified. The next day the trial court granted the Boseman 
unopposed motion to exclude the testimony of one of Rohan's experts on the grounds 
that there was no timely opposition. A: 13: 
On June 19,2000 Rohan filed his Renewed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal or 
Alternatively Motion to Continue Trial Setting to Consider Plaintiffs Claims under the 
ADA, with a supporting Affidavit, in which he made a prima facie showing that he was 
a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA and requested the reasonable 
accommodation of either a continuance to obtain counsel or voluntary dismissal. 
A: 14,15,16. When the parties appeared on June 20, 2000, the scheduled date of the 
trial, Rohan's motion to continue and for voluntary dismissal pursuant to the ADA was 
denied. The trial court refused to make an individualized inquiry into the claim asserted 
by Rohan that he was a qualified individual with a disability pursuant to the ADA as 
required by the statute, instead the trial court "rules as stated on the record and orders 
this case be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Defendants are awarded 
costs and fees in an amount to be determined per Rule 4-501." A: 18:75-77. On July 
31,2000 the Order and Judgment against Rohan in the amount of $7347.78 was filed 
A:20:l-3. 
On August 7,2000 Rohan filed a motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59 or 
Alternatively Motion to Amend, A:21, 22, 23, again raising his claims that the ADA 
-10-
had been violated. On September 28, 2000 the trial court again, without making an 
individualized ii lqi in y into R ohai i's claii i is that 1 le w as a qi lalified indrv idual \ ith a 
disability pursuant to the ADA, denied the motion, and issued a minute entry ruling 
stating, "Plaintiffs Motion for N e w Trial, etc. is denied for reasons specified in the 
opposing memorandum. Counsel for Defendant to prepare Order."A:26:237-238. 
S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
1. On January 27, 199 7, the Appellant, Joseph Rohan was injured in a 
traffic accident when a vehicle driven by Chad Boseman struck Mr. Rohan's vehicle 
during an early morning snowstorm in Salt Lake City. A*1 1 
2 . I • '" • • ' ' M r M M . 
accident by orthopedic surgeon William Muinvi. u. m n p n i r ^ / , u a r^r i* > 
headaches and cognitive problems had not improved, Muir recommended he see a 
neurologist. 
3. I lesawi lecrologistR c:>l:>ei*t IVliskaIN 1. D , \ v 1: 10 diagnosed Rohan as! ia\ ii ig 
suffered a eiu: : ;ad in ji n > ii i ti le accident. Dr. Miska stated, """ \ MR I scai i doi le 
after the accident showed changes typical for closed head injury with axonal shearing 
including atrophy disproportionate to age and some small areas of increased T2 
sign • 
4. Dr. Miska ordered neuropsychological testing which was administered 
by Erin Bigler Ph.D. This testing showed disrupted cognitive performance, with Mr. 
11 
Rohan's performance being substantially below what would be expected, given his 
educational and vocational background. A:23:134-137 
5. In November 1997 Dr. Miska referred Rohan to Mark Fox for cognitive 
therapy. At this time Rohan was tested with the Ross Information Processing 
Assessment-2, which is normed on individuals who have suffered a brain injury, his 
mean score of 10 represented a moderate dysfunction. Rohan received cognitive 
therapy for about two years. A:23:138-144. 
6. In July 1998, Dr. Miska referred Rohan to the Intermountain Sleep 
Disorders Center to address the chronic sleep disruption that he had suffered since the 
accident. Mr. Rohan underwent a sleep study, which showed a severely disrupted sleep 
cycle with a sleep efficiency of 41% (normal is greater than 90%), and a total absence 
of REM, stage III & IV sleep. Additionally, measurements of the Rohan's 
attentiveness were markedly abnormal. As a result of this testing Rohan was diagnosed 
as suffering with excessive daytime sleepiness and was prescribed stimulant 
medications, it is anticipated he will need to take these medications indefinitely to 
maintain wakefulness. A:23:130, 146-48, 165. 
7. On August 8, 1998 Rohan was seen by Robert K. Rothfeder M. D., for 
an independent medical examination. Dr. Rothfeder found that as a result of the 
injuries sustained in the accident Mr. Rohan had sustained a 34% permanent partial 
impairment of the whole person. Dr. Rothfeder noted the closed head injury and 
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posttraumatic brain injury along with sleep disturbance "has had a profound affect on 
tl le patient's acti\ ities of claily li v ing." A:231165 166, 
8. : Dr. Rothfeder is also an attorney. He stated tl mt in "\\ as his opinion tl :ie 
intellectual impairments suffered by Mr. Rohan in the accident had essentially resulted 
in a 100% disability with respect to the independent practice of law. A:23:166. 
9. After receivii lg Di R othfedei 's i epoi t, ai id being concen led w ith his 
ethical responsibilities, Rohan contacted with the Utah State Bar , Office of 
Professional Conduct (the "OPC"). The OPC did not initiate public or private disability7 
proceedings against Mr. Rohan however as a result of this contact, after discussions 
between R,oli;m IhtM UH' ami nicinhcrs of tin: linn nl Ilnlliila\ <\"„ WatkinsP.C. it was 
understood that members of Halliday & Watkins would voluntarily supervise R ohan 
in various aspects of his legal practice to insure that Rohan could practice law 
responsibly and ethically as the OPC has no mechanism available for informal 
supervision ol an ;illoiiir\, A.24...!0(k>01. • ' • 
10. Rohan filed his lawsuit on A pril 28, 1998 seeking damages foi the 
injuries, including the closed head injury, sustained in the accident. A: 1:1 
11. Following the filing of the lawsuit, the parties initiated discovery. 
Boseman si ibpoenaed i ecords fron l an 101 lg otl lei s, tl le I Jtal i State Bar. / V: 1::: 1 -2 
12. Bar Counsel opposed the subpoena on the ^ronmN Hi it n ^night 
privileged material and filed a motion to quash on October 16, 1998. A: 1:1 
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13. On December 11, 1998 the trial court issued a Minute Entry Ruling 
granting the "Ut. State Bar's Objection to Subpoena, etc." ruling that until Plaintiff 
supplies Defendant's with an express waiver for materials sought from the Bar, the 
Plaintiff will be precluded from asserting claims as stated in the minute entry. A:l :2 
14. On February 3, 1999 the Order on the Utah State Bar's Objection to 
Subpoena was filed; On March 15, 1999 Rohan filed a certificate of service of 
discovery; On April 14, 1999 Boseman filed a certificate of service of discovery. On 
August 19,1999, Rohan filed a Notice of Deposition of Jerald Boseman; On August 
31,1999 Rohan filed a Stipulation and Order on Protective Order; On September 30, 
1999 Boseman filed a notice of deposition of Dr. Nord; On October 4,1999 Boseman 
filed a notice of deposition of Mr. Rohan. A: 1:2. 
15. Despite the fact that the court docket reflected activity during 14 of 20 
months since the complaint had been filed, the trial court, on October 28,1999, on its 
own motion ordered the parties to appear on November 18, 1999 and show cause why 
the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. A:l :2: 
16. On November 18, 1999 the trial court continued its own order to show 
cause for 60 days for certification of readiness for trial; On January 19, 2000, Rohan, 
pursuant to the trial court's order, filed his certification of readiness for trial. A:2:12: 
17. On February 1, 2000, Boseman filed an Objection to Plaintiffs 
Certificate of Readiness for Trial on the basis that there is ongoing discovery that had 
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not been completed, and requested 120 days to complete discovery. A:l :3, 3:15. 
18. On February 2, 2000 the trial court scheduled a telephone scheduling 
conference to be held on March 2, 2000. At the March 2, 2000 conference, the 
discovery cutoff was set for May 26, 2000, the pretrial was set for June 5, 2000 and a 
jury trial was set for June 20, 2000, the trial court did not address the Boseman 
objection to the certification of readiness for trial. A:l :4-5. 
19. Rohan attended a neuropsychological evaluation performed by the 
Boseman's expert, Elaine Clark PhD., on May 5, 2000. Dr. Clark's report was not 
faxed to Rohan until June 6,2000, a day after the trial court had denied Rohan's first 
motion to continue and 10 days after discovery had closed. A:23:154. 
20. Dr. Clark's report showed that as of May 5, 2000, weeks before trial, 
Rohan was severely impaired in terms of memory skills and information processing. 
Although he performed better on a test of visual attention than he had in May of 1997, 
his visual memory remained severely impaired i.e. below the 10% percentile. The 
testing also showed significant impairment in the his verbal memory and learning, 
other problems noted by Dr. Clark included confusion and poor mental tracking. 
A:23:154 
21. After the March scheduling conference, Rohan began searching for 
experienced trial counsel, because Mr. Halliday and Mr. Watkins had limited jury trial 
experience and they did not have any experience trying a brain injury case. A:6:24 
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22. Rohan, realizing he needed substitute counsel, contacted several 
experienced trial attorneys during March 2000. Rohan contacted, and signed a fee 
agreement, with Robert F. Orton of the law firm of Fabian & Clendenin to try the 
case. Orton attended Mr. Rohan's supplemental deposition on March 30,2000 and told 
opposing counsel he was going to be making an appearance in the case. He also 
represented Rohan at a supplemental deposition on April 26, 2000 and examined 
medical records at the offices of Strong & Hanni in May of 2000. A:24:174,184 
23. Approximately one week before the scheduled pretrial on June 5,2000, 
Orton informed Rohan that would not try the case because he could not have the 
experts he needed ready for a June 20,2000 trial. However, Mr. Orton agreed that Mr. 
Rohan could represent to the Court that if he were able to secure a ninety day 
continuance Orton would try the matter. A:6:24 
24. Upon learning at that late date that Orton would not try the case without 
a continuance, and with no hope of finding an attorney to try a brain injury case on 
such short notice, Rohan filed a Motion for Continuance of Trial Setting, Withdrawal 
of Counsel, Substitution of Counsel and Enlargement of Discovery (hereinafter the 
"first motion for a continuance") on June 2, 2000. This was the Friday before the 
Monday final pre-trial and eighteen days before the scheduled trial. Prior to filing the 
motion Boseman was asked to stipulate to the motion, which they declined, they 
agreed not to oppose the motion. A:4:16. 
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25. At the June 5, 2000 pretrial, the trial court denied the first motion for 
a continuance on the grounds that there is no showing of good cause and decision to 
change counsel 15 days before trial is too late. A:7: 27-28. 
26. After the first motion for a continuance was denied, and knowing that 
Mr. Halliday & Mr. Watkins were not prepared to represent him, as they had been 
under the impression since March that Orton would try the case, Rohan filed a Notice 
of Discharge of his attorneys and a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal (hereinafter the 
"first motion for voluntary dismissal") on June 7,2000. A:8:30,9: 32-35. On June 14, 
2000 the trial court denied the first motion for voluntary dismissal "for the reasons 
specified in the opposing memorandum." A: 11:41. 
27. On June 15, 2000, Mr. Rohan, in order prevent additional expense by 
Boseman and the trial court filed a Notice of Plaintiff s Inability to Bring This Matter 
to Trial. A: 12-43. The day after the notice, was filed the trial court granted the 
unopposed Boseman motion into exclude testimony of witness Ingebretsen. "there 
being no timely opposition." A: 13:45. 
28. On June 19, 2000 Rohan filed his Renewed Motion for Voluntary 
Dismissal or Alternatively Motion to Continue Trial Setting to Consider Plaintiffs 
Claims under the ADA, (hereinafter the "second motion for voluntary dismissal" or 
"second motion for a continuance") with supporting Affidavit, in which Rohan made 
a prima facie showing that he was a qualified individual with a disability pursuant to 
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the statutory requirements of the ADA and requested the reasonable accommodation 
of either a continuance or voluntary dismissal. A: 14:47, 15:50-56, 16:57-64. 
29. On June 20,2000 the parties appeared for trial. A: 18:71. Rohan's second 
motion for voluntary dismissal or to continue was denied. The trial court without 
conducting the statutorily mandated individualized inquiry into the ADA claims raised 
by Mr. Rohan, "rules as stated on the record and orders this case be dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to prosecute. Defendants are awarded costs and fees in an amount 
to be determined per Rule 4-501. Attorney Trayner to prepare findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and judgment including jury fees." A: 18:75-76. 
30. On July 31, 2000 the Order and Judgment in the amount of $7347.78 
against Rohan was filed and the case was dismissed with prejudice. A:20:88. 
31. On August 7,2000 Rohan filed a motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 
59 or Alternatively Motion to Amend, (hereinafter the "motion for new trial") A:21:91. 
On September 28, 2000 the trial court issued a minute entry ruling stating, "Plaintiffs 
Motion for New Trial, etc. is denied for reasons specified in the opposing 
memorandum. Counsel for Defendant to prepare Order." A:26:237-8. The order on the 
motion for a new trial was filed on November 2, 2000. A:27:239-40. 
32. Rohan filed his Notice of Appeal on November 30, 2000. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Title II, Subchapter A of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
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12132, bars public entities from discriminating on the basis of a disability and provides 
that no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such a disability, be 
excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. The 
term "qualified individual with a disability" is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), as an 
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, 
policies, or practices . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of 
services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity. 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that the question of 
whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry. See 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.. 527 U. S. 471, 483 (1999), Bragdon v. Abbott. 524 
U.S. 624, 641-642, (1998); PGA Tour. Inc.. v. Martin 121 S.Ct. 1879,1896 (2001). 
However, even after Rohan presented prima facie evidence to the trial court 
demonstrating that he was a qualified individual with a disability the trial court refused 
to engage in such a individualized inquiry and therefore discriminated against him as 
defined by the act. 
The trial court also violated the act by refusing to conduct an individualized 
inquiry to determine whether his request for a accommodation permitting a 90 day 
continuance or voluntary dismissal was a fundamental alteration of the judicial process 
again violating the statute. The trial court's refusal to consider Rohan's personal 
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circumstances in deciding whether to accommodate his disability runs counter to the 
clear language and purpose of the ADA. The ADA was enacted to eliminate 
discrimination against "individuals" with disabilities, and to that end the act requires 
without exception that rules, policies, practices or procedures of a public entity be 
reasonably modified for disabled "individuals" as necessary to afford access, unless 
doing so would fundamentally alter what is offered. 
Unquestionably, neither a continuance or voluntary dismissal is a unreasonable 
modification that would fundamentally change the operation courts. The trial court's 
refusal to consider Mr. Rohan's claims pursuant to the ADA was erroneous as a matter 
of law and violated not only the ADA but Rohan's due process and equal protections 
as guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1, 
The trial court erred as a matter of law and violated the 
provisions of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, and 
Mr. Rohan's due process and equal protection rights as guaranteed 
by the both the Constitution of the United States and the Utah 
Constitution when it failed to grant a continuance or voluntary 
dismissal and dismissed his case with prejudice after Rohan had 
made a prima facie showing that he was a qualified individual with 
a disability pursuant to the provisions of the ADA. 
Mr. Rohan raised his claims pursuant to the ADA in his Renewed Motion for 
Voluntary Dismissal or Alternatively Motion to Continue Trial Setting to Consider 
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Plaintiffs Claims Under the ADA and in his Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 
59 or Alternatively Motion to Amend. A: 14, 21. 
The trial court denied the motion ruling: 
2. Plaintiff failed to comply with or to make the requisite 
showing under Rule 4-105(3) with respect to his Motions to Continue the 
Trial in this case in that plaintiff failed to show good cause for such a 
continuance; 
4. That plaintiffs assertion that the trial of this case must be 
delayed or continued due to the provisions of Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act is without foundation in law or in fact; 
5. The provisions of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act do no require that this court grant plaintiffs request for a 
continuance and/or a voluntary dismissal without prejudice; 
The trial court issued a minute entry in response to Rohan's motion for 
new trial ruling: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial etc. is denied for the reasons 
specified in the opposing memorandum. 
The trial court erred as a matter as a matter of law and discriminated against 
Rohan by failing conduct a individualized inquiry into Rohan's claim that he was a 
qualified individual with a disability pursuant to the terms of the ADA, by refusing to 
consider whether Rohan's request for an accommodation in the form of a 90 day 
continuance or voluntary dismissal without prejudice was "reasonable, whether it was 
necessary for the disabled individual, and whether it would fundamentally alter the 
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nature of the judicial process ." PGA Tour. Inc. 121 S.Ct. 1896. 
L Violation of the ADA. 
The ADA forbids discrimination against disabled individuals in major areas of 
public life, among them employment (Title I of the Act), public services (Title II), and 
public accommodations (Title III). A "public entity," includes "any department, 
agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local 
government. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskev. 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1955 
(1998). Seealso28C.F.R. §35.104. The courts of this state unquestionably are public 
entities falling within the mandate of the of the act. 
Title II, Subchapter A of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§12132, bars public entities from discriminating on the basis of a disability in the 
provision of programs and benefits to qualified individuals, it provides that: 
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity. 
The act is applicable only to qualified individuals with a disability not to the 
public at large. The question of whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an 
individualized inquiry. Sutton v. United Air Lines. Inc., 527 U. S. 471,483 (1999). The 
operative language of Title II must be read in conjunction with applicable 
implementing regulations. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158, (1990). The 
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Tenth Circuit evaluates whether a individual states a claim under Title II by applying 
the three part standard articulated in Tyler v City of Manhattan, 849 F. Supp. 1429 (D. 
Kan. 1994), that substantially tracks the EEOC implementing regulations. To state a 
cause of action under Title II of the ADA the individual must prove: 
(A.) That he [or she] is a qualified individual with a disability; 
(B.) That he [or she] was either excluded from participation in or denied the 
benefits of some public entity's services, programs or activities, or was 
otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and 
(C.) That such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason 
of the Plaintiffs disability. 
Mr. Rohan presented undisputed evidence to the trial court that he was a 
qualified individual with a disability, that the denial of his motions for a continuance 
or voluntary dismissal resulted in his exclusion from participation in or denial of the 
benefits of the judicial process to redress his injuries, or he was otherwise 
discriminated against by the trial court; and the exclusion, denial of benefits, or 
discrimination was by reason of his disability in that the trial court refused to conduct 
a individualized inquiry to consider his claim pursuant to the ADA once it had been 
presented with unchallenged evidence that he was a qualified individual with a 
disability. By so doing the trial court discriminated against Mr. Rohan as a matter of 
law. 
(A.) Rohan a qualified individual with a disability. 
The first requirement necessary to state a claim pursuant to Title II of the ADA, 
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is that the individual must show he is a qualified individual with a disability. This is a 
two step process that requires the individual to first show that he is disabled, and then 
the individual must next show he is a qualified individual with an disability. 
The term "qualified individual with a disability" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 
12131(2) as: 
An individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of 
architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the 
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility 
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public entity. 
Mr. Rohan presented uncontested evidence to the trial court showing that he is 
disabled as defined by the ADA and that he is a qualified individual with a disability. 
A:16:57-64, 23:120-169. 
1. Rohan meets the elements of disability as defined by the ADA. 
The U. S. Supreme Court, in affirming the Tenth Circuit in Sutton v. United Air 
Lines. Inc.. 130 F.3d 893, 902 (C.A.10 1997), affd, 527 U.S. 471, 474-78 (1999), 
looked to the EEOC implementing regulations to construe the meaning of the term 
disability as used in the ADA. Sutton at 527 U.S., 474-478. The regulations define 
three essential elements of a disability: (a.) physical or mental impairment, (b.) 
substantially limits, and (c.) major life activities. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h>0). Taking 
these three elements in turn it is clear that Rohan is disabled as defined by the act. 
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(a.) Physical or Mental Impairment 
The first essential element that Mr. Rohan must show to meet the definition of 
disability as used in the ADA is that he suffers from a physical or mental impairment 
that is covered by the act. The EEOC regulations define a physical or mental 
impairment to include any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, 
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, 
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), 
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and 
endocrine. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). 
Unlike the other titles of the Act, Title II does not list all of the forms of 
discrimination that the title was intended to prohibit. Because of this the Attorney 
General was directed to issue regulations setting forth the forms of discrimination 
prohibited. In response to this congressional mandate the Department of Justice (DO)) 
issued regulations defining the forms of discrimination prohibited by Title II of the 
ADA. [28 C. F. R. pt. 35 (1992) which became effective on January 26, 1992 nr 
Section 36.508]. Because the DOJ is the agency directed by Congress to issue Title II 
regulations, its views warrant respect. The well-reasoned views of the agencies 
implementing a statute constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 
524 U.S. 624, 642. 
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The definition of "impairment" as used by the DO J regulation is essentially the 
same as EEOC definition. However, unlike the EEOC regulation, brain injury is 
specifically dealt with at pages 35:698-35:700 of the Department of Justice 
Commentaries to the Title II implementing regulation: 
"As explained in paragraph (l)(i) of the definition, "impairment" 
means any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, 
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: 
neurological . . . It also means any mental or psychological disorder, 
such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental 
illness, and specific learning disabilities. 
Many commentators asked that "traumatic brain injury" be added 
to the list in paragraph (l)(i). Traumatic brain injury is already 
included because it is a physiological condition affecting one of the 
listed body systems, i.e., "neurological." Therefore, it was unnecessary 
to add the term to the regulation, which only provides representative 
examples of physiological disorders." (Emphasis Added). 
Mr. Rohan presented the following undisputed objective evidence to the trial 
court showing that his brain injury that meet the of the definition of a neurological 
impairment. 
A CT scan of Rohan's brain taken before the accident showed a normal brain 
scan. A:23:128. However, an MRI of his brain taken after the accident, was interpreted 
as abnormal, A:23:129, interestingly the same radiologist read both scans. Rohan's 
treating neurologist reported the MRI showed changes typical for closed head injury 
with axonal shearing. Neuropsychological testing performed in May 1997 showed 
disrupted cognitive performance, with performance being substantially below what 
would be expected. Rohan has been evaluated with testing that was meaned on 
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individuals confirmed to have suffered brain injury and his score represented a 
moderate dysfunction on this scale. A:23:139. Finally, in the response to the motion 
for a new trial Boseman did not dispute the fact that Mr. Rohan is afflicted by '<\ 
neurological disorder that meets the definition of a disability under the ADA. 
A:24:181. 
(b.) Substantially Limited. 
The second essential element Mr. Rohan must show to meet the definition of 
disability as used in the ADA is that he is substantially limited. The term "substantially 
limits" means, among other things, "[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the 
average person in the general population can perform; or significantly restricted as to 
the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular 
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the 
average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity." 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). Additionally, an individual is disabled when the impairment in fact 
"substantially limits" a major life activity, not where it "might," "could," or "would" 
be substantially limiting if corrective measures were not taken. Sutton at 483. A 
physical impairment need not appear on a specific list of disorders to constitute a 
disability, nor must the impairment affect those aspects of a persons life that have 
strictly a public or economic character. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624 (1998). 
The Tenth Circuit also applies a three factor test that was gleaned from the 
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implementing regulations to determine whether an individual is "substantially limited" 
in a major life activity. These are: (/) the nature and severity of the impairment, (//) the 
duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (Hi) the permanent or expected 
long-term impact of the impairment. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 900. Taking these three 
factors in turn it is clear that Rohan was substantially limited in any number of major 
life activities. 
/. The nature and severity of the impairment: Rohan presented 
unchallenged objective medical evidence (CT, MRI, neuropsychological testing) to the 
trial court showing that he has a physical or mental impairment covered by the act. 
Rohan presented evidence of from the Boseman nueropsychologist, showing that just 
weeks before the trial he was severely impaired in terms of memory skills, information 
processing and visual memory. Rohan also presented uncontested evidence to the trial 
court establishing that he had been diagnosed with excessive daytime sleepiness, that 
he was taking stimulant medications to maintain wakefulness, that he did not dream, 
that he was constantly fatigued and often had to interrupt his practice to take naps, that 
colleagues often had call him to awaken him in the mornings, that he suffers from 
severe debilitating headaches which sometime prevent him from doing any activities 
at all, including maintaining a legal practice, and that he contacted the Utah State Bar, 
Office of Professional Conduct due to concerns about his disability and as a result of 
those contacts members of the law firm of Halliday and Watkins P.C., informally 
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supervise Mr. Rohan's practice. A:23:122-123. This evidence amply demonstrated 
to the trial court both the nature of the impairment suffered by Rohan and its severity. 
II. The duration or expected duration of the impairment: Rohan presented 
objective medical evidence to the trial court establishing the fact that the had exhibited 
the symptoms of traumatic brain injury since the January 1997 accident and there was 
no indication that the impairment was improving or will improve even after several 
years of cognitive therapy and treatment with various medications. A:23:165. In fact, 
neuropsychological testing performed by Dr. Clark in May 2000 revealed that the 
cognitive defects experience by Rohan were not only were not improving, but they 
were the same or worse than before. A:23:163. 
Rohan will require maintenance of his present regimen of medications 
indefinitely. Although the medications are able to mitigate the more drastic effects of 
the brain injury dealing with wakefulness, he remains significantly restricted in every 
facet of his daily life as compared to the average person. Rohan's condition has become 
chronic and static, and he was assigned a permanent partial impairment of the whole 
person of 34% and a 100% impairment with respect to the independent practice of law. 
A:23:166. The closed head injury and posttraumatic brain injury along with sleep 
disturbance has lasted for 4 years and "has had a profound affect on the patient's 
activities of daily living" and is expected to continue indefinitely. 
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Hi. The permanent or expected long-term impact of the impairment. Mr. 
Rohan also presented unchallenged objective medical evidence to the trial court 
showing the impairments to be severe, permanent, and they will impact every aspect 
of his life indefinitely. Medical records reveal that Mr. Rohan "has reported significant 
difficulties since his accident in completing both activities of daily living and work 
related activities . . . Specifically, Mr. Rohan experiences significant difficulties 
attending to important information for a given task. He experiences a decrease in his 
attentional abilities as the complexity of the information increases and as distractions 
are introduced. This has and will continue to significantly impact his abilities to 
complete activities at home and at work." A:23:142. As noted above the Boseman 
nueropsycholgist stated, "Data from the current neuropsychological evaluation show 
Mr. Rohan is severely impaired... Despite receiving cognitive rehabilitation since the 
time of the first evaluation by Dr. Bigler, Mr. Rohan seems to be doing the same or 
worse in a number of areas." 
Having met the test showing he is substantially limited, Rohan was also required 
to demonstrate to the trial court that the limitation applies to major life activities which 
he did in fact do. 
(c.) Major life activities. 
The third essential element of the definition of disability as used in the ADA 
is that Rohan's participation in major life activities is substantially limited by his 
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disability. The United States Supreme Court, using the EEOC definition, has stated 
that major life activities mean, among other things functions such as caring for oneself, 
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Id. The ADA "addresses substantial limitations on 
major life activities, not utter inabilities," Bragdon at 641, and as it has repeatedly 
done, the Court observed, the determination of whether an individual is substantially 
limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis. Id. at 642. 
Rohan presented uncontested evidence to the trial court that he was, is, and will 
be substantially limited in virtually all major life activities for the rest of his life. This 
evidence included the fact that Mr. Rohan's cognitive skills are severely impaired and 
are continuing to decline. The sleep problems continue despite the medication, as do 
the headaches, the fatigue, the memory problems, and the inattention. The myriad of 
symptoms and impairments related to the objectively documented brain injury persist 
and cannot be mitigated. The record before the trial court unquestionably demonstrated 
that Rohan is presently, not potentially or hypothetically, substantially limited in any 
number of major life activities ranging from thinking, to memory, to attentiveness, to 
staying awake, to staying asleep and even to dreaming. The disability produced by the 
brain injury has altered every aspect of his personal and professional life. Rohan is 
unquestionably "substantially limited" in every major life activity and is disabled as 
provided by the ADA. 
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2. Rohan is a qualified individual with a disability as defined by the 
ADA. 
Once a individual demonstrates that he is disabled, the individual must then 
show that he is a qualified individual with a disability in order to receive the 
protections of the ADA 
Under Title II, a "qualified individual" is an individual with a disability who 
"with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices,... meets the 
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or participation in the 
programs or activities provided by a public entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). (Emphasis 
Added). 
Mr. Rohan, as a litigant seeking redress through the state courts for the injuries 
he suffered in an accident, unquestionably meets the essential eligibility requirements 
for participation in the judicial process. The accommodation of a continuance or 
voluntary dismissal was a reasonable modification to the rules of procedure permitting 
access to the courts by Mr. Rohan and should have been granted. 
The ADA was enacted to eliminate discrimination against "individuals" with 
disabilities, and to that end the Act requires without exception that rules, policies, 
practices or procedures of a private or public entity be reasonably modified for disabled 
"individuals" as necessary to afford access, unless doing so would fundamentally alter 
what is offered. To comply with this command, an individualized inquiry must be made 
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to determine whether a specific modification for a particular person's disability would 
be reasonable under the circumstances as well as necessary for that person, and yet at 
the same time not work a fundamental alteration to the process. PGA., 121 S.Ct. at 
1896. As with the mandate that the trial court must make a individualized inquiry as 
to Rohan's claims that he is disabled, the trial court was also mandated to conduct a 
individualized inquiry into the nature of the accommodation he was requesting. The 
trial could erred as a matter of law and discriminated against the plaintiff when it failed 
to do so. 
The trial court made neither a individualized inquiry into the reasonableness of 
Rohan's request for an accommodation nor did it enter findings of fact and conclusions 
of law to support denial his request for a continuance or voluntary dismissal without 
prejudice. As a matter of law, because the trial court failed to conduct the 
individualized inquiry required by the act, the only conclusion this Court can reach is 
given the evidence and the circumstances surrounding his disability, the 
accommodation requested by Rohan was reasonable, it was necessary to enable 
meaningful access to the judicial process, and because the request was made within 
the frame work of currently existing rules of procedure his request would not 
fundamentally alter the nature of the judicial process. 
(B.) Rohan was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of 
the Courts services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated 
against. 
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Once it had been shown that Rohan was a qualified individual with a disability, 
the second requirement that he must meet to state a claim is to show that he was 
excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the Courts services, programs 
or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against. 
Title II is violated when a qualified individual is prevented from participating 
in or benefitting from a public service, program, or activity, by reason of a qualifying 
disability, regardless of whether the entity intended to discriminate against the disabled 
person. Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir.1996). Under the 
plain meaning of the ADA exclusion from participation in or denial of the benefits of 
a public entities, services, programs or activities, to a qualified individual is 
discrimination. 
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to remedy widespread discrimination 
against disabled individuals. In studying the need for such legislation, Congress found 
that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with 
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem." 42 
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2); see § 12101(a)(3) ("[Discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public 
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, 
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services"). Congress 
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noted that the many forms such discrimination takes include "outright intentional 
exclusion" as well as the "failure to make modifications to existing facilities and 
practices." §12101(a)(5). Congress concluded that there was a "compelling need" for 
a "clear and comprehensive national mandate" to eliminate discrimination against 
disabled individuals, and to integrate them "into the economic and social mainstream 
of American life." PGA at 1889. 
The ADA regulations provide that "a public entity shall operate each service, 
program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its 
entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities."28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.150(a). The regulations require public entities to "make reasonable modifications 
in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid 
discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that 
making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, 
or activity. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). Requiring the trial court to comply with the ADA 
by granting a continuance to conduct an individualized inquiry is a reasonable 
accommodation that does not fundamentally alter the nature of the judicial process. 
Boseman in opposition to the motion for a new trial argued that Rohan was not 
in any way discriminated against or denied access to the courts, and in fact, the 
evidence showed the opposite. They argued that Rohan was permitted to initiate his 
lawsuit, conduct discovery and was given the opportunity to present his case, with or 
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without representation, to a jury, and it was his own conduct and decisions that 
prevented him from actually having the opportunity to go through with trial. Essentially 
the Boseman's argue that Mr. Rohan was not discriminated against because he was not 
treated any differently than any other litigant. 
This argument misses the point and the mandate of the ADA. The United States 
Supreme Court has concluded that Congress had specifically authorized a more 
comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination than mere differential treatment 
in enacting the ADA. See Olmstead v. L.C.. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). Title II specifies 
that no qualified individual with a disability shall, 'by reason of such disability,' be 
excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of a public entity's services, 
programs, or activities. It is the exclusion or denial of benefits to a qualified individual 
with a disability that forms the basis of the discrimination that is proscribed by Title II 
of the ADA, not differential treatment. 
(C.) That such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by 
reason of the Plaintiffs disability. 
The final requirement to state a claim pursuant to Title II of the ADA, the 
individual must show the exclusion was by reason of the disability. 
Rohan demonstrated to the trial court that he was a qualified individual with a 
disability with unrefuted objective medical evidence. The reason Rohan made the 
motions was because of his brain injury. The brain injury prevented he him from trying 
his own case. The trial court simply concluded that because Rohan was a licensed 
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attorney he could try his own case. 
The fact that Rohan is a attorney would have been relevant to an individualized 
inquiry as to whether Rohan was a qualified individual with a disability and whether 
the accommodation he was requesting was reasonable. But because the trial court failed 
to inquire further and only considered the fact that he was an attorney, Rohan was 
discriminated against by reason of his disability. 
II. Violation of Mr. Rohan's Due Process & Equal Protection Rights. 
Article L section 7 of the Utah Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." "Due process" is not a 
technical concept that can be reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place, and circumstances. Rather "the demands of due process rest on the 
concept of basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case 
and just to the parties involved." Rupp v. Grantsville City, Utah, 610 P.2d 338, 341 
(1980). 
The basic premise upon which our judicial system rests is the notion that the 
judiciary exists to afford litigants the opportunity to be heard and to do justice between 
them. This principle was articulated by United States Supreme Court in Wilson v. 
Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902). The Court noted the fundamental obligation of 
government is to provide reasonable remedies for wrongs done persons. "Every 
government is under obligation to its citizens to afford them all needful legal 
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remedies." Wilson at 62. "The right to be [compensated] for personal injuries is a 
substantial property right, not only of monetary value but in many cases fundamental 
to the injured person's physical well-being and ability to continue to live a decent life." 
Condemarin v. University Hospital 775 P.2d 348, 360 (Utah 1989). 
Rohan has shown that the trial court had uncontested evidence before it to 
conclude that the ADA may be applicable to his claims. He drew the trial court's 
attention to the mandate of the United States Supreme court that an individualized 
inquiry into Rohan's ADA claims was required. The trial court chose to ignore both 
the statute and the facts, thus denying Rohan his due process rights as guaranteed the 
Utah constitution and offending the fundamental principle of fairness that underpins 
the judicial process. 
The opportunity to prepare for trial is core to the concept of due process. The 
trial courts myopic insistence that a brain injured Plaintiff who is also an attorney must 
try his own case, without even one continuance to properly prepare, violates the due 
process guarantees of the Utah constitution and the concept of basic fairness that the 
rules of procedure are supposed to embody . 
Article L section 11 of the Utah Constitution states: All courts shall be open, 
and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
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any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Article I, Section 11 was designed to accomplish several purposes. The clear 
language of the section guarantees access to the courts and a judicial procedure and is 
premises on basic concepts of fairness and equality. Section 11 also establishes that the 
framers of the [Utah] Constitution intended that an individual could not be arbitrarily 
deprived of effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights. The 
constitutional guarantee of access to the courthouse was not intended by the founders 
to be an empty gesture, individuals are entitled to a remedy by "due course of law" for 
injuries to "person, property, or reputation." Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 
670, 675(Utah 1985) 
Rohan presented unchallenged evidence to the trial court that he is a qualified 
individual with a disability as defined by the ADA. The denial of his motions and the 
dismissal with prejudice with the imposition of fees and costs, under the facts of this 
case was neither fair, nor were the rules and procedures equally and uniformly applied. 
The trial court made the guarantee of access to the courthouse espoused by the Utah 
constitution an empty gesture for the individual litigant with a brain injury. 
Article L section 24 of the Utah Constitution states: "All laws of a general 
nature shall have uniform operation." 
The section "protects against two types of discrimination. First, a law must 
apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the statutory classifications and the 
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different treatment given the classes must be based on differences that have a 
reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute." Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 
661,670 (Utah 1984). 
The uniform operation of laws provision establishes different requirements than 
does the Federal Equal Protection Clause. "[F]or a law to be constitutional under 
[Section 24], it is not enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the 
operation of the law be uniform. A law does not operate uniformly if 'persons 
similarly situated' are not 'treated similarly\..." Malan, at 669. 
Both Rule 4-105 and Rule 41 are uniform as applied to an individual with a 
disability only in that they can operate to uniformly exclude disabled individuals, with 
a qualified disability under the ADA from participation in the litigation process. The 
rules in effect grant the Court discretion to discriminate against disabled litigants. 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: 
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In asserting a due process violation, 
Rohan must show the trial court acted in two ways. Rohan must show the trial court 
deprived him of his life, liberty, or property. Second, Rohan must show that 
deprivation was made without the required legal process. 
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Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce 
the substantive guarantees contained in § 1 by enacting "appropriate legislation." See 
CityofBoernev.Flores. 521 U.S. 507, 536, (1997). Congress' power 'to enforce' the 
Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights 
guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including 
that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text." CityofBoerne, at 536. In 
passing the ADA and making it applicable to public entities Congress intended to 
protect the rights of all citizens against discrimination by the states. Rohan has shown 
that the trial court deprived him of his life, liberty, or property. Rohan has also shown 
that because the trial court acted in contravention of the ADA the deprivation was 
made without the legal process required by the United States Constitution. 
The equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment sanctions both 
"passive" and "active" discrimination. The Utah Supreme Court has noted that the 
equal protection guarantees of the Utah and Federal Constitutions "embody the same 
general principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in 
different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." 
Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984). The Plaintiff has demonstrated that 
he is a qualified individual with a disability. His circumstances as a disabled litigant 
appearing before the trial court were distinctly different than those of a litigant 
appearing before the same tribunal without a disability. However, the trial court even 
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after becoming aware of the Appellant's circumstances treated him as any other 
litigant in spite of his reasonable request for a modification, thus depriving him of 
equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
POINT 2. 
The trial court abused its discretion, when it denied Mr. 
Rohan's first motion for a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 
41(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
The trial court erred as a matter of law, and abused its 
discretion when it denied Mr. Rohan's second motion for voluntary 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) after Mr. Rohan had made a 
prima facie showing that he was a qualified individual with a 
disability under the ADA; 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed Mr. 
Rohan's case with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 
A. First Motion for Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2)(ii) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The trial court in a unsigned minute entry on June 14,2000 (Order Signed June 
20, 2000) ruled: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Voluntary Dismissal is denied for the 
reasons specified in the opposing memorandum. 
2. Counsel for defendants to prepare the order. 
There are relatively few cases in Ulah that deal with the application of Rule 
41(a)(2)(ii). However the rule is substantially similar to the Federal Rule. The Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized the persuasiveness of federal interpretations when the 
state and federal rules are similar and few Utah cases deal with the rule. Pate v. 
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Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 & n. 1 (Utah 1984). 
In the Federal Circuits a decision to deny Plaintiffs motion for voluntary 
dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. American 
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bic Corp.. 931 F.2d 1411, 1412 (10th Cir.1991). The 
Circuits have concluded that absent "legal prejudice" to the defendant, the district court 
normally should grant a dismissal. The Tenth Circuit has stated that although the 
parameters of what constitutes "legal prejudice" are not entirely clear, there are several 
relevant factors the court should consider, including: the opposing party's effort and 
expense in preparing for trial; excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the 
movant; insufficient explanation of the need for a dismissal; and the stage of litigation. 
Phillips U.S.A.. Inc. v. Allflex U.S.A.. Inc.. 77 F.3d 354, 358 (10th Cir.1996). Each 
factor need not be resolved in favor of the moving party for dismissal to be appropriate, 
nor need each factor be resolved in favor of the opposing party for denial of the motion 
to be proper. 
The court should endeavor to insure substantial justice is accorded to both 
parties. "A court, therefore, must consider the equities not only facing the defendant, 
but also those facing the plaintiff; a court's refusal to do so is a denial of a full and 
complete exercise of judicial discretion. In a complex case . . . it is critically important 
when considering a motion to dismiss, that the court give the equities of the plaintiff 
the attention deserved." Ohlander. v. Larson 114 F. 3d 1531, (10th Cir.1997), 
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Finally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court must remember the 
important factors in determining legal prejudice are those involving the parties, not the 
court's time or effort spent on the case. Clark v. Tansv. 13 F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th 
Cir. 1993). A court abuses its discretion when it denies a motion to dismiss under Rule 
41 (a)(2) based on its inconvenience. In sum, the district court was obligated to consider 
the novelty of the circumstances surrounding the case. Id. 
The trial court clearly put its own convenience ahead of the concept of doing 
justice between the parties in this case. Boseman was not prejudiced by a voluntary 
dismissal, in that they opposed the certification of readiness for trial, nor did they 
oppose the original motion for a continuance. It was only after it became apparent that 
the trial intended to push the matter to trial and sanction Rohan that they jumped on the 
bandwagon and asserted prejudice. The trial court refused to consider the prejudice 
to Rohan, which is denial of a full and complete exercise of judicial discretion. 
B. Second Motion for Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2)(ii) 
after Mr. Rohan after Mr. Rohan had made a prima facie showing that he was 
a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA; 
The trial court denied Mr. Rohan's Motion to Continue Trial Setting To 
Consider Plaintiffs Claims under the ADA at the trial ruling 
The provisions of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
do no require that this court grant plaintiffs request for a continuance 
and/or a voluntary dismissal without prejudice; 
The trial court was required, once Rohan had presented a prima facie showing 
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that he was a qualified individual with a disability, to conduct an individualized 
inquiry. By failing to conduct the inquiry the trial court discriminated against the 
Appellant, erred as a matter of law, and abused its discretion by refusing to voluntarily 
dismiss the matter. 
C. The Trial Court's Involuntary Dismissal of Mr. Rohan's case with 
Prejudice Pursuant to Rule 4Kb) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It is well established that the trial court may . . . dismiss an action for want of 
prosecution under Rule 41(b). Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 
P.2d 1368,1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). This authority is an " inherent power, governed 
not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their 
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Charlie 
Brown Constr. Co., 740 P.2d at 1370 (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 
630-31(1962)). The trial court has a "reasonable latitude of discretion in dismissing 
for failure to prosecute if a party fails to move forward according to the rules and the 
directions of the court, without justifiable excuse." Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. 
v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Utah 1975). 
A court's discretion, however, must be balanced against a higher priority: to 
"afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them." 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 544 P.2d at 879. In Westinghouse, the Utah Supreme 
Court established five factors to be evaluated in conjunction with the amount of time 
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that elapsed since the suit was filed, the factors considered include the following: (1) 
the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had to move the case 
forward; (3) what each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4) what 
difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other side; and (5) most important, 
whether injustice may result from the dismissal. 
The burden is on the party "attacking a dismissal for failure to prosecute [to] 
offer a reasonable excuse for its lack of diligence." Country Meadows Convalescent 
Center v. Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing, 851 P.2d 
1212,1215 (Utah Ct. App.1993). Rohan's explanation that he could not try his own 
brain injury case is certainly a justifiable excuse. Rohan had signed a fee agreement 
with Robert Orton to try the matter, but a week before the pre-trial he learned Orton 
would not try the case because he could not adequately prepare. In response, Rohan 
made a flurry of motions in an attempt to secure a short continuance or voluntary 
dismissal. Boseman only claimed prejudice when it became clear that the trial court 
was determined push the matter to trial in spite of any of motions Rohan might make 
or any facts presented to it. The record demonstrates that both parties had been moving 
the matter forward, in fact Boseman objected to the pace, filing a objection to court 
ordered certification of readiness for trial. There was no difficulty or prejudice caused 
to Boseman by a voluntary dismissal but there has been a great injustice to Rohan 
resulting from the dismissal. 
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POINT 3. 
The trial court abused its discretion in contravention of Rule 40(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, when it denied Mr. Rohan's first 
motion for a continuance; 
The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion 
when it denied Mr. Rohan's second motion a continuance after Mr. Rohan 
after Mr. Rohan had made a prima facie showing that he was a qualified 
individual with a disability under the ADA. 
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in its relevant parts provides 
that upon motion of a party, the court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may 
be just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a 
trial or proceeding upon good cause shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of 
the absence of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence 
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to procure it. 
Rule 40 allows the trial court to postpone a trial upon a showing of good cause 
A trial court has substantial discretion in deciding whether to grant continuances, 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988). A party is not necessarily 
entitled to a continuance because counsel is unable to be present on the date set for 
trial. See Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375,1376 (Utah 1977); see also Lundgreen 
v. Lundgreen. 112 Utah 31, 34, 184 P.2d 670, 671-72 (1947). 
Nevertheless, an abuse of discretion may be found if, a party has made timely 
objections, [has] given necessary notice, and has made a reasonable effort to have the 
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trial date changed for good cause. Brown v. Glover. 16 P.3d 540, 548-9 (Utah 2000). 
As soon as Rohan realized that he was not represented for his upcoming trial he made 
a flurry of motions and timely objections including two motions to continue, two 
motions for voluntary dismissal, and a motion for a new trial, additionally, he gave 
notice to the trial court that he could not try his own case, and he made every 
reasonable effort possible to have ave the trial date changed for good cause. 
A. First Motion for a Continuance of Trial Setting, 
The trial court denied Rohan's first motion for a continuance ruling: 
1 Plaintiff has served his Motion for Continuance\ etc. on 
June 5, 2000 seeking to continue the trial set for June 20, 2000 to allow 
substitution of counsel to extend discovery deadline, etc. Plaintiff has 
had the same counsel since the matter was filed April 23, 1998. 
2. Because this matter was not moved forward, this Court 
was required to impose a 60 day certification order pursuant to an 
Order to Show Cause hearing November 18, 1999. 
3. Counsel for defendants while not actively resisting the 
instant motion, will not stipulate to it. 
4. This Court after review of the matter denies the request for 
continuance/substitution as there is no good cause showing for such 
continuance. A decision to change counsel 15 days before the trial date 
under the present circumstances is too late. 
The trial court abused its discretion and reached the erroneous conclusion that 
Rohan was not diligent in pursuing his cause and in obtaining the services of substitute 
counsel. There is nothing in the record to support this conclusion. 
Mr. Rohan served his first motion for a continuance on June 2,2000, admittedly 
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shortly before the scheduled pretrial, but not on June 5, 
The court ruled in the minute entry that because the matter was not moved 
forward, the court was required to impose a 60 day certification order. The docket 
refutes this contention A: 1:1 -2. There was activity in the case during 14 of 20 months 
elapsing since the filing of the Complaint. The parties were conducting discovery, 
depositions had been scheduled and the trail court had spent five months dealing with 
the motion of bar counsel to quash discovery. Although Rohan complied with the 
court's order and timely filed his notice of readiness for trial on January 19, 2000, the 
Boseman's filed an Objection to Plaintiffs Certificate of Readiness for Trial on the 
basis that there was ongoing discovery that had not been completed, and requested 120 
days (until June 1, 2000) to complete discovery. 
The record clearly shows that not only was the case being moved forward but 
the Boseman' were objecting to the pace at which it was being moved forward. The 
trial court's ruling that the matter was not moved forward is wrong, it is not supported 
by the record, and it is arbitrary and capricious. 
The court ruled that "there is no good cause showing for such continuance. A 
decision to change counsel 15 days before the trial date under the present 
circumstances is too late." Again the record does not support this conclusion nor does 
it articulate the circumstances giving rise to the conclusion. 
Good cause was shown Rohan had been diligently pursuing the case since it had 
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been filed. Rohan contacted and signed a fee agreement with Orton to try the case. 
From March of 2000 onward, Orton was representing Rohan and was actively involved 
in preparing the case for trial. As late as May of 2000, Rohan was attending the 
medical examinations conducted by the Boseman experts. The report from the 
Boseman neuropsychological expert was not provided to Rohan until June 6,2000 the 
day after the trial court denied the first motion for a continuance and 10 days after the 
close of discovery, effectively foreclosing the ability to Mr. Rohan to depose the expert 
or adequately prepare for trial even if he could have tried the matter himself. 
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying Rohan's first motion for 
a continuance based on a lack of good cause. 
B. Second Motion for a Continuance of Trial Setting 
The trial court denied Mr. Rohan's Motion to Continue Trial Setting To 
Consider Plaintiffs Claims under the ADA at the trial ruling. 
2. Plaintiff failed to comply with or to make the requisite 
showing under Rule 4-105(3) with respect to his Motions to Continue the 
Trial in this case in that plaintiff failed to show good cause for such a 
continuance; 
4. That plaintiffs assertion that the trial of this case must be 
delayed or continued due to the provisions of Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act is without foundation in law or in fact; 
5. The provisions of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act do no require that this court grant plaintiffs request for a 
continuance and/or a voluntary dismissal without prejudice; 
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The trial courts' ruling that Rohan failed to show good cause for a continuance, 
after he had made a prima facie showing that he was qualified individual with a 
disability pursuant to the ADA was erroneous as a matter of law. 
"A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of 
law." Koon v. United States. 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 (1996). Once Mr. Rohan had 
brought a claim under the ADA, even if it was the day before trial, the trial court was 
required to make an individualized inquiry as to whether he was a qualified individual 
with a disability. However, this was an inquiry that the trial court refused to make. 
In Rohan's memorandum in support of the motion, he set out the applicable 
provisions of Title II of the ADA. A:15:51-55. He specifically stated that the ADA is 
applicable to state courts and he was a qualified individual with a disability under the 
act in that his brain injury was a mental impairment, and he presented evidence that he 
was substantially limited in one or more of his major life activities. He provided 
objective documentation of his brain injury referring to the results of medical imaging, 
neuropsychological testing and a sleep study. He presented evidence that he was 
substantially impaired and that the brain injury had a profound affect on his activities 
of daily living, it was opined that the intellectual impairments suffered by Rohan had 
essentially resulted in a 100% disability with respect to the practice of law. These 
contentions were undisputed by the Defendants, therefore Rohan had made a prima 
facie showing that was a qualified individual with a disability. 
-51-
The Boseman' in their Memorandum in Opposition, which was unsupported 
by either an affidavit or competent expert testimony, simply asserted that "Plaintiff has 
attempted to suggest that his disability consists of a brain injury which prevents him 
from competently practicing law, and therefore preventing him from representing 
himself in this trial. This claim is absurd in light of the fact he is a licensed member of 
the Utah State Bar.. ." 
Therefore, the trial court by definition erred as a matter of law and abused its 
discretion by denying the second motion for a continuance. 
POINT 4. 
The trial Court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of 
law when it denied of Mr. Rohan's motions for a new trial or 
alternatively motion to amend when he had made a prima facie 
showing that he was a qualified individual with an disability under 
the ADA. 
On September 28, 2000 the trial court issued a two sentence minute entry in 
response to Mr. Rohan's motion for new trial ruling: 
/. Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial, etc. is denied for the 
reasons specified in the opposing memorandum. 
2. Counsel for defendants to prepare order 
The general rule governing the grant of a new trial is that the trial court must 
find at least one of the seven grounds listed in Rule 59 to be met. Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange.. 817 P.2d 789, 803 (Utah 1991). 
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Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Provides in the Relevant Parts: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for 
any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for 
a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the 
judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse 
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either 
party was prevented from having a fair trial... 
(7) Error in law. 
The trial court abused its discretion by: (1) failing to identify or articulate any 
facts, in light of the Rohan's disability under the ADA, to support a showing of good 
cause to justify the denial of his motions for a continuance; (2) failing to identify or 
articulate any facts, in light of the Rohan's disability under the ADA, to support a 
finding that Rohan did not raise a justifiable excuse to denying the motions for 
voluntary dismissal as provided by Rule 41(a)(2)(ii) and in dismissing his cause with 
prejudice with the award of costs and fees; and (3) discriminating against the Rohan 
under the ADA and the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law by: (1) failing to apply the provisions 
of the ADA to the facts of this case, by failing to make a determination whether the 
Rohan was a qualified individual under the ADA, and by discriminating against Rohan 
on the basis of his disability; (2) denying Rohan his rights under Article I, section 11, 
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Article I, section 24, Article I, section 7 Utah State Constitution, and Article XIV of 
the United States Constitution. 
POINT 5, 
The award of costs and fees and attorney fees pursuant to U. 
C. A. §78-27-56 against Mr. Rohan was erroneous as a matter of 
law. 
The award of attorney fees under section 78-27-56 requires a two step analysis. 
The court must find that the party lacked good faith, this requires that the trial court 
must make a factual finding of a party's subjective intent. In addition, the trial court 
must conclude, as a matter of law, that the action was without merit. Pennington v. 
Allstate Insurance Co.. 973 P.2d 932, 942 (Fn 3 ) (Utah 1998). 
In order to find that a party acted in bad faith, the trial court must determine that 
at least one of the following factors existed: (i) The party lacked an honest belief in the 
propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party intended to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted with the knowledge that the 
activities in question would hinder, delay, or defraud others. Cady v. Johnson, 671 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
Just as the trial Court failed to inquire into the Plaintiff s claims under the ADA, 
The trial court failed to make factual finding as to Mr. Rohan's subjective intent nor 
did it conclude as a matter of law that Mr. Rohan acted in bad faith. The award of costs 
and attorneys' fees is unjustified. 
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When a party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, ""he party 
is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah Depft of Social Servs. v. 
Adams. 806 P.2d 1193,1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In the event the Appellant prevails 
in this appeal, he respectfully asks the court to award reasonable costs and attorneys' 
fees he has incurred in pursuing this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred and a matter of law and discriminated against Mr. Rohan 
by refusing to conduct an individualized inquiry into his claims pursuant to the ADA 
when he had made a prima facie showing that he was a qualified individual with a 
disability as defined by the act. The trial court also erred as a matter of law and abused 
its discretion in denying the motions for a continuance, voluntary dismissal and for a 
new trial. 
The Appellant respectfully asks this Court to: reverse the trial court; to dismiss 
the action without prejudice; to vacate the judgment entered against Rohan; and to 
award Rohan the costs and fees he has incurred in bringing this appeal. 
ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a) 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure a separately 
bound addendum accompanies this brief. Due to it's bulk and cost, the addendum will 
be mailed to the parties under a separate cover and hand delivered to the Court of 
Appeals. 
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